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This paper proposes a theory of socially optimal districting in a legislative-
election model with endogenous party platforms. We generalize the model of Coate
and Knight (2007), allowing parties to strategically condition their platforms on the
districting. The socially optimal districting reects the ideological leaning of the
population, so that parties internalize voters' preferences in their policy platforms.
The optimal seat{vote curve is unbiased when voters are risk-neutral, and|contrary
to previous ndings|biased against the largest partisan group when voters are risk-
averse. The model is then calibrated by an econometric analysis of the elections of
U.S. State legislators during the 1990s.
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11 Introduction
The districting process has been the object of increasing attention from politicians
and scholars of both economics and political science. The way district boundaries
are drawn can have a substantial eect on the implemented policy, inuencing par-
ties' decisions on their proposed platforms and determining the relation between
citizens' voting behavior and the composition of the legislature. The classic Down-
sian benchmark suggesting that voters' preferences, and in particular those of the
median voter, determine the policy outcome can be easily altered to someone's favor
through strategic reapportionment. Over time, increased technological possibilities
and the availability of more precise data on voters has greatly enhanced the potential
of strategic reapportionment and its eects.
The existing literature has mainly concentrated on strategic redistricting, or
gerrymandering. This is the process of re-drawing the district lines in order to
maximize the chances of victory of one party, or insure re-election to incumbent
representatives. Optimal districting has instead been neglected until very recently.
This paper contributes to this new strand of literature analyzing the districting
from a normative perspective. In particular we focus on the case in which parties
strategically choose their policy platforms vis- a-vis the districting. In addition,
an empirical analysis of the potential welfare gain from implementing the socially
optimal districting is performed with data of State Lower House elections of 28 U.S.
States from 1992 to 2000.1
Our paper generalizes and expands Coate and Knight's (2007) analysis on so-
cially optimal districting. Their paper describes a polity in which two parties pro-
pose exogenous policy platforms, and then bargain in the legislature over the policy
to implement: the implemented policy is mechanically chosen as the average be-
tween the two parties' exogenous policy platforms, weighted by the seat-share of
each party in the legislature. In this framework they dene which is the optimal
seat{vote curve. This also means that the implemented policy is smoothly related
with the legislature composition. The seat{vote curve is a relation S(V ) which links
the aggregate share of votes for the Democratic Party to its seat share in the leg-
islature. There is a large empirical literature (surveyed in the next section) that
attempts to estimate this function, and in particular its bias and responsiveness.
An electoral system which gives rise to a biased seat{vote curve is one which awards
more (or less) than half of the seats to the party that receives exactly half of the
votes (S(1=2) 6= 1=2). Responsiveness indicates how the seat share awarded to a
party changes with the variation of its vote share (S=V ).
Their nding is that the socially optimal seat{vote curve is biased in favor of
the party with a larger partisan base. Therefore the social planner needs to let
the implemented policy mirror the policy preferred (on average) by the population.
In the primary scenario, in which voters are risk-averse, the optimal policy leans
towards the party with a wider partisan base. In a setup in which the implemented
policy changes smoothly at the variations of the legislature composition, in order to
reach the social optimum, the seat{vote curve needs therefore to reward the larger
1The dataset, compiled by Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002), has been kindly provided by Brian Knight,
to whom we are greatly indebted. This dateset has been used for the empirical analysis in Coate and
Knight (2007).
2party, i.e. it needs to be biased in its favor.2
Our setup instead allows parties to strategically choose the policy platforms
vis- a-vis the districting drawn by the social planner. The legislature then chooses
by majority voting the policy to implement.3 Parties compete to win the median
district, i.e. the district that awards them the majority in the legislature, and
the social planner anticipates their equilibrium policy platforms and the electoral
behavior of voters in order for the expected implemented policy to match the social
optimum.
The parties' Nash equilibrium strategy is to \follow" the districting (i.e. the
median district's) ideological leaning, each shifting its policy platform leftwards
(rightwards) if the median district contains more (less) Democrats than Republi-
cans. The social planner therefore needs to design a median district that mirrors
the population's ideological composition, so that both parties' policy platforms are
endogenously dragged towards the social optimum.
This cancels the need for a seat{vote curve which is biased in favor of the majority
party. There is thus no need to articially increase the electoral weight of the votes
obtained by the larger party. On the contrary, the optimal seat{vote curve has a
bias in the opposite direction of Coate and Knight's (2007): a negative bias, that
counterbalances the weight of the larger partisan group.
This counterintuitive nding depends on the electoral outcome under socially
optimal districting. First of all, electoral competition leads parties to tie in the
election for the median representative, and therefore to expect that each carry 50%
of the districts. At the same time, at the national level, the party with a larger
partisan base still obtains an absolute majority of votes. Such an electoral result|
a majority of votes, but only half of the seats|is coherent, as anticipated, with a
negatively biased seat{vote curve.
If we were to follow the prescription of Coate and Knight (2007), designing
a system with a positive bias, we would need to create a median district heavily
slanted in favor of the majority party, which would in turn push the expected
implemented policy heavily towards the majority party's bliss point, away from the
social optimum.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 surveys the related literature, Sec-
tion 2.3 describes the theoretical model, in Section 2.4 we solve the model, Section
2.5 contains the econometric analysis, and Section 2.6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The welfare and policy eects of districting are relatively unexplored topics in the
existing literature. The two seminal papers on these topics are Besley and Preston
(2007) and Coate and Knight (2007).
The latter has already been extensively discussed in the Introduction. The for-
mer investigates specically the eect of districting on the policies proposed by
2The optimal bias is instead going to be zero in the special case in which voters are risk-neutral, which
is not analyzed by Coate and Knight (2007). In the Appendix a more detailed analysis of Coate and
Knight (2007) in case of risk-neutral players is given.
3For completeness and as a robustness check the legislative bargaining solution  a la Coate and Knight
(2007) is also analyzed.
3parties, i.e. how parties which endogenously set their policy platforms take the dis-
tricting into consideration in their decision-making. In Besley and Preston's (2007)
model, parties strategically propose a nationwide platform after having observed
the districting, and the implemented policy is chosen by the party which obtains a
parliamentary majority. Their nding is that, as long as the policy space is linear,
both parties' proposed policies will be dragged towards the same side towards which
the districting is biased. If, instead, the policy space is multi-dimensional, the eect
of the districting on parties' policy platform cannot be determined.
Most of the existing work on redistricting focuses on ecient partisan gerryman-
dering, i.e. how a party which is in control of the districting process can maximize
its seat share or the probability of obtaining a working majority, or bipartisan ger-
rymandering, whose aim is to guarantee the re-election of incumbents. Owen and
Grofman (1988), Sherstyuk (1998), and Friedman and Holden (2008) are the most
representative examples.
Shotts (2002), Epstein and O'Hallaran (2004), Gilligan and Matsusaka (2006),
and Gul and Pesendorfer (2010) give insight also into the policy and welfare conse-
quences of redistricting. The last of these analyzes the eect of gerrymandering on
parties' policy platforms at the U.S. federal level, where each party (through State
governors or legislators) has power over a number of federal congressional districts.
Their nding is that the party which has the power to gerrymander the majority of
districts will stick to its preferred (and extreme) policy, while the \minority" party
will try to gain votes by proposing a centrist policy.
Gilligan and Matsusaka (2006) also focus on the eect of partisan gerryman-
dering on policy platforms with a median-voter approach. Their paper compares
the median voter's preferred policy with that of the median representative (i.e. the
median voter of the median district). Their approach to the welfare analysis is done
through analyzing how the maximum distance between these two policies varies
with the number of voters and the number of elected representatives. Our approach
diers from theirs in that we focus on the ecient policy outcome, i.e. the wel-
fare maximizing (average) preferred policy, rather than the policy which has the
approval of a majority of citizens, i.e. the median citizen's preferred policy.
Shotts (2002) and Epstein and O'Hallaran (2004) analyze minorities' represen-
tation and their welfare. In particular they analyze the eects of the existence of
majority-minority districts, i.e. districts in which the majority of the population
belongs to a minority (typically, African-Americans or Latinos). The former is a
theoretical model that looks into the eects of the existence of these kinds of districts
on the median legislator's preferred policy, in an institutional setup that mirrors the
Federal House of Representatives (each party gerrymanders a share of the districts).
The latter explores whether the interests of minorities (namely, African-American
voters) can be better represented through majority-minority districts electing black
Representatives (descriptive representation), or through districts in which the black
constituents manage to substantially inuence the elected ocer's actions (substan-
tive representation).
Our work also relates to the wider electoral-competition literature, and more
generally to the political economy literature on the optimal design of political in-
stitutions. In particular our results can be easily related to those obtained by
Wittman (1983), Calvert (1985), Callander (2008) and Bernhardt et al. (2009).
4All these papers describe electoral models which extend the classic Downsian ap-
proach. Calvert's paper contains, as does this paper, simultaneously policy- and
oce-motivated parties. In both Calvert's and in the present paper the classic
Downsian result of policy convergence to the median voter's position no longer
holds. The combined eect of uncertainty, policy motivation and ideological pref-
erences generates an outcome in which the proposed policies do not completely
converge. Both in the present and in Callander's (2008) paper, as long as there
is sucient ideological heterogeneity among candidates, the more oce-motivated
candidates propose policies nearer to the ecient one. By contrast, Bernhardt et
al. (2009) analyzes the welfare eect of policy divergence, as opposed to the classic
Downsian convergence result, when voters' preferences are hit by some shocks of
known distribution. Its ndings are that a moderate policy divergence could be
welfare enhancing, working as a sort of insurance for risk-averse voters against the
uncertainty of the position of the optimal policy.
Within the wider literature on the optimal design of political institution we
can cite Lizzeri and Persico (2001) on electoral systems, Lockwood (2002) on the
distribution of tasks across tiers of government, Prat (2002) and Coate (2004) on
campaign nance, Persson et al. (2000) on the pros and cons of parliamentary
rather than presidential systems. All these papers overlook the eects of districting
on electoral outcomes and welfare.
This paper's empirical analysis can be related to the long-standing literature
which tries to estimate the seat{vote curve. The seminal paper of this literature
is Kendall and Stewart (1950), which used British data and a log-odds functional
form, and stated the famous \Cube Law," referring to the responsiveness of the
British electoral system. Gelman and King (1994), among others, developed a
statistical methodology to estimate the seat{vote curve and to predict the eect of
majority-minority districts, also taking into account how the composition of districts
aects the electoral outcome. Coate and Knight (2007) developed an econometric
technique in order to estimate, through Monte Carlo simulations, the compositions
of an electoral district (i.e. how many partisan Democrats, partisan Republicans
and Independents there are in each district) through the electoral and demographic
data at the district level and through opinion polls at the State level. The empirical
analysis of this paper is largely in debt to their analysis, and is performed on the
same dataset.
3 The Model
There exists a continuum of voters of mass 1 with Euclidean preferences dened
over the policy space [0;1]. Letting i be the bliss point of a given voter, and x the
implemented policy, his or her utility is dened as:
ui = L(i;x) (1)
where L is a generic symmetric loss function on the distance ji   xj.
Voters are characterized by their preferred policy, and are of three types: Democrats,
Republicans, and Independents, also referred to as swing voters, of mass respectively
D, R, and I, with D + R + I = 1. The Democrats' ideal policy is 0 and the
Republicans' is 1. The social planner decides the districting , i.e. how voters
5are spread along a continuum of districts j. In district j there is a share Dj of
Democrats, a share Rj of Republicans, and a share Ij, with Dj +Rj +Ij = 1.
Following Coate (2004), swing voters' bliss points ! are uniformly distributed as
U[m   ;m + ], with cumulative distribution function F(!) = (!   m + )=(2),
where m is the median swing voter. The median swing voter's bliss point is the
realization of a random variable m  U[1=2 ;1=2+], with cumulative distribution
function H(m) = (m   1=2 + )=(2). The two distributions can be thought of as
an idiosyncratic and an aggregate shock hitting independent voters' preferences.
It must be noted that swing voters are assumed to be on average (and ex-ante)
centrist; the median swing voter's preferred policy is expected to be equidistant
from the extremes of the policy line (E[m] = 1=2). This is a standard assumption
that allows us to have a clear cut distinction between partisans and Independents,
and captures the ex-ante uncertainty on independent voters' preferences. These two
distributions are common knowledge, but the realization of m remains unknown to
players.
To avoid the possibility of a swing voter being more extremist than party mem-
bers, the following assumption is made:
Assumption 1.  +   1=2
Parties share the bliss point with their members, and in addition receive a posi-
tive utility windfall 
 in case of victory. Parties are therefore simultaneously oce-
and policy-motivated. The Democratic (Republican) Party strategically chooses its
policy platform d (r) vis- a-vis the districting  in order to maximize its expected
utility. The Democratic and Republican Parties' Nash equilibrium strategies are








Expanding the expected utilities:
E[UD] = p [
   L(0;d()] + (1   p) L(0;r())
E[UR] = p L(1;d() + (1   p) [
 + L(0;r()]
where p is the Democratic Party's probability of winning. We will see how this
probability depends on the districting  both directly and indirectly through par-
ties' policies ffd();r()g. Given that the expected utilities are continuous and
dened over a compact set, existence of a Nash equilibrium is not an issue.4 In each
district, parties eld candidates that run on their Nash equilibrium policy platforms
fd(); r()g, and commit to implementing their policy platform in case of victory.
The issue of the credibility of the parties' commitment to the publicly announced
policy platform is beyond the scope of this paper; nevertheless we would assume
4The existence of multiple equilibria is also excluded. As we will see in the next section, in the
linear case uniqueness is implied by the fact that the equilibrium sees parties playing strictly dominant
strategies. The risk-averse case is instead solved numerically, and neither in our simulations nor through
graphical analysis did we nd evidence of the existence of any other equilibrium than the one described
in Section 2.4.2.
6that parties, following the standard citizen-candidate models (Osborne and Slivin-
ski [1996], Besley and Coate [1997]), would commit to a particular policy through
elding a candidate whose preferences corresponded to the party's policy choice.
Alternatively, we can think of the proposed platforms as the result of a repeated
game with voters as in Alesina (1988).
In each district voters vote sincerely for the candidate with the policy that is
nearer to their ideal point. The tie-breaking rule is a random draw. The candidate
with the most votes is elected as a Representative. The Representatives then meet
in the legislature and decide through majority voting (again with a random draw
as a tie-breaking rule) the policy to implement between d and r.
The districting that maximizes the social welfare, dened as the sum of the utility







E[ Ui(d();r()) ] s.t.  2 Z (4)
with Z being the set of feasible districting.
Abstracting from geographical constraints, a districting  is feasible if the average
share of voters of each type across districts matches the population's shares, i.e.:
Z
j
zj = z for 8z 2 fD;R;Ig
and each district contains an equal mass of voters, i.e.:
Dj + Rj + Ij = 1; 8j
This is the equivalent of having each voter belonging to one and only one district,
and each district containing the same number of voters.
The nal step of our analysis is to dene the correspondence between the optimal
districting  and the seat{vote curve S(V;) generated by it. Summing up, the
timing of the game is the following:
1. A districting plan  is implemented.
2. Parties commit to policies fd();r()g 2 [0;1].
3. The position of the median voter m is drawn from its distribution.
4. Citizens vote and in each district and the candidates with the most votes are
elected.
5. The elected legislature votes to decide between the two policies and the one
that obtains a majority is implemented.
The equilibrium concept is the subgame-perfect Nash equilbrium.
4 Theoretical Results
In this section we will solve the model, obtaining the equilibrium policy platforms
and the socially optimal districting. For simplicity of exposition we will to start
from the special case in which voters and parties are risk-neutral.
74.1 Case 1: Risk-Neutral Voters
When voters and parties are risk-neutral, the utilities of parties and of a voter i are
UD = 
   d; UR =  (1   d); Ui =  ji   dj
if the Democratic Party wins, and
UD =  r; UR = 
   (1   r); Ui =  ji   rj
if the Republican Party wins.
We focus our attention on a single district j, which contains a share Ij of
Independents, and a share Dj of Democrats.
In order to rule out a scenario in which the Republican Party's policy platform
is more liberal than the Democratic Party's, and to keep the equilibrium policy
platforms and the probability of winning for any party within the interior of the
unit interval, one assumption is made:
Assumption 2. 
 < 2
In district j there will be a swing voter whose preferred policy is the midpoint
between d and r who is indierent between voting Democrat or Republican. The
Democratic Party therefore carries the district if the partisan Democrats and the
share of swing voters to the left of the indierent voter add up to more than a
50%-share:







Using the formula for F(), we can rearrange the expression bringing on the left-hand
side the parameters related to the composition of the district:
2Dj + Ij   1
Ij
> 1   2
r+d
2   m + 
2
Moreover, given that Rj = (1   Dj   Ij), we can rewrite this expression as
Dj   Rj
Ij
> 1   2
r+d
2   m + 
2
(6)




Each district j's behavior is therefore described by the value of its partisan slant in
favor of the Democrats j. The Democratic Party carries this generic district if j
is greater than the right hand side of (6).
This variable assumes the value zero if the district has the same proportion of
partisans of each ideology (Dj = Rj) and its absolute value is inversely propor-
tional to the amount of Independents. In addition through simple calculations we
8can see how a district with j > 1 is a safe Democratic district, i.e. a district in
which the Democratic Party always obtains at least 50% of the votes. Similarly, a
district with j <  1 is a safe Republican district.
Ordering the districts according to their partisan slants j, we can observe how
the only district that matters in order to determine the implemented policy is the
median one, that is the one determining the parliamentary majority. This means
that given a certain median district's partisan slant ~ M, all the feasible districts  2
Z such that M = ~ M are equivalent from the point of view of parties and the social
planner. They elicit the same strategic behavior from parties, and therefore give
the same prescriptions to the social planner for the social optimum to be reached.
Starting from this consideration we can nd a closed form solution for the prob-
ability of winning of the Democratic Party.
Lemma 1. The probability p that the Democratic Party wins the election, condi-














where M is the value of partisan slant of the median district in favor of the
Democrats.
Proof. See Appendix. 
As anticipated, the Democratic Party's probability of winning depends on the
districting per se (M) and on the parties' policy platforms. It increases the more
the Democratic policy is to the right (in order to get more votes in the center),
the more the Republican policy is extremist, and the more the median district is
leaning towards the Democratic Party.5 These eects are all larger the smaller is
the aggregate uncertainty ().
Given the voting behavior just stated, we can solve the problem set up in (2){(3)




   d) + [1   p(d;r)] ( r)g (8)
r = argmax
r
fp(d;r) (d   1) + [1   p(d;r)] (
   r + 1)g (9)
where, from Lemma 1, the probability of winning for the Democratic Party p(d;r)
depends on the policy proposals of the two parties. Thus, through simple rst
order conditions, we can nd the Nash equilibrium (and dominant strategy) policy
platforms given the districting.
5In our analysis we shall restrict our attention to the value of M within the interval [ 1;1]. Tech-
nically, this insures our being in an interior solution for what concerns the policy platforms and the
probability of winning. Moreover, as already stated, we know that any j outside that range would
generate a safe seat, i.e. a seat in which one of the two parties wins with probability 1. Allowing the
median district to be a safe seat implies including in our analysis the case in which one party wins a
majority of seats with probability 1, i.e. there is no meaningful electoral competition

















   M (11)
The equilibrium probability of winning therefore becomes
p = p(d;r) =
1
2
Consistently with Besley and Preston (2007), the districting, represented by the
leaning of the median district M, drags the proposed policies towards the side
towards which the districting is leaning. The oce-motivation variable 
 drives the
policies towards the center, in search of the vote of Independents.
This result relies on the symmetry of the loss function that enters into the parties'
utilities. Because of this, the districting aects both parties' platforms in exactly
the same way.
The next step is to calculate the social welfare function as dened in (4) for this
specic case. Given a specic median voter's realization ~ m, and an implemented
policy t, the social welfare is:




where I, D, and R are the average the share of Independents, Democrats and
Republicans at the national level and L is the loss function already introduced.
From the proof of Lemma 1 (in the Appendix) it is also known that the median
district (and with it the general election) will be won by the Democratic Party as
long as the position of the median voter ~ m falls to the left of a threshold level  m.




+ M   m











where d(M) and r(M) are the equilibrium values of d and r.
The socially optimal districting, or the socially optimal median district (which
is the same), is identied as the M that maximizes (13). The social planner's aim
is to design a median district such that the expected implemented policy [p d +
(1   p) r] is equal to the ecient policy, i.e. to the average preferred policy. We
dene therefore 
M as the socially optimal median district.

























Proposition 2. To implement a welfare-maximizing districting, the median district






as long as Condition 1 holds. When Condition 1 does not hold, the socially optimal










if  2 [ 1;a] (16)
Proof. See Appendix. 
The rst part of the Proposition shows that the welfare maximizing districting
implies a (socially optimal) median district which is slanted in the same direction as
the overall population leaning. More specically, the median district's partisan slant
M must exactly reect the population composition. The median district could be
a perfect microcosm of the whole community.
In case the distribution of ideologies in the population is particularly unbalanced
(if Condition 1 does not hold, as in the second part of the Proposition), the socially
optimal districting will imply a median district that is more \extremist" than the
population as a whole. This depends primarily on technical reasons, which are
thoroughly explained in the proof of Proposition 2.
Finally, even if we chose to follow the long tradition of abstracting from geo-
graphical constraints, some words are still needed on the feasibility of the socially
optimal districting. Our simple conclusion is that the optimality condition on the
median district imposed by Proposition 2 is always feasible. The most intuitive
example for this would be to have the so-called \uniform districting," i.e. having all
the districts with the exact same composition, which is of course the general pop-
ulation's composition as well. A more formal discussion of feasibility constraints is
given in the Appendix.
The Seat{Vote Curve
The next step is to nd the seat{vote curve that is consistent with the socially
optimal districting. The seat{vote curve is a mathematical relation S(V ) that links
the number of votes obtained by a party at the national level with the amount of
seats won in the legislature.
In our model the policy to be implemented is decided by majority voting in the
legislature, i.e. by the median legislator. Consequently, from the welfare point of
view, whether a party has a slim or an overwhelming majority in the legislature is
11irrelevant: the implemented policy would in fact be the same. In order to reach the
welfare optimum it is required that the two policy platforms and the composition of
the legislature are such that the expected implemented policy matches the socially
optimal policy. For this reason it is structurally impossible to nd a unique seat{vote
curve that would maximize social welfare.
It is possible, however, to characterize the voting behavior of the median district
in equilibrium. More precisely, we are going to investigate which party carries the
median district (i.e. obtains a majority in the legislature) when both parties obtain
half of the votes at the national level. In this way we can pin down the position of
the seat{vote curve in one point at least (V = 1=2), and from that determine the
direction of the bias.
The bias of the seat{vote curve is dened as
 = S(1=2)  
1
2
The value of the bias  represents how many seats over the cut-o of 50% the
Democratic Party obtains in correspondence to 50% of the votes.
When each party obtains 50% of votes at the national level, the party which
wins in the median district enjoys a bias in its favor, having obtained an absolute
majority of seats with only half of the votes. Taking the Democratic Party as a
reference, if the median district were carried by the Democratic Party, this would
mean that the seat{vote curve is positively biased ( > 0); if the median district
were carried by the Republicans, then of course the bias would be negative ( < 0).
A further denition is introduced: we dene a bias as \reinforcing" if it favors
the party with the largest partisan base, and \counterbalancing" if it favors the
smallest partisan group, i.e.
reinforcing : if
(
 > 0 and D > R
 < 0 and D < R
counterbalancing : if
(
 > 0 and D < R
 < 0 and D > R
Lemma 2. The seat{vote curve has a positive bias  > 0 if the median district
is more slanted towards the Democrats than the whole population, a negative bias
 < 0 if the median district is more slanted towards the Republican than the whole
population, and no bias  = 0 if the median district's partisan slant mirrors the












)  = 0
Proof. See Appendix. 
This leads us to one of the major ndings of this paper:
12Proposition 3. The seat{vote curve is unbiased ( = 0) if the socially optimal
districting is implemented and Condition 1 holds.
If Condition 1 does not hold, the optimal seat{vote curve will be biased in favor
of the party most represented in the population (reinforcing bias).
Proof. See Appendix. 
If the population is ideologically \balanced enough" (i.e., Condition 1 holds),
the socially optimal seat{vote curve must not be biased: no party should get any
advantage from the districting. When the population composition is very extremist
(i.e., Condition 1 does not hold), the bias will be reinforcing, i.e. it will favor the
party that has the larger popular support.
The intuition of this can be easily explained. From Proposition 2 we know that
as long as Condition 1 holds, in equilibrium the median district will be a microcosm





therefore its voting behavior will exactly reect the national voting pattern.
If the parties, at the national level, each obtain half of the vote, the same will
happen in the median district, with each party expecting to obtain a majority in
the legislature with 50% probability. This implies an unbiased seat{vote curve.
In equilibrium, parties condition their platforms on the districting, following
its ideological leaning; in turn, the social planner draws the districting in a way
that reects the population's average ideology. In this way, the social planner forces
parties to \internalize" the population preferences, dragging both platforms towards
the social optimum. The expected winning policy is already consistent with the
social optimum, and there is no need to give further advantage to any party through
a biased seat{vote curve.
This rst result of our paper, for the special case in which players are risk-neutral,
is in line with what would have happened to the results of Coate and Knight (2007),
had they considered the risk-neutral case.
4.2 Case 2: Risk-Averse voters
We now analyze the more general case in which parties and citizens are risk-averse.
We assume that preferences are symmetric around the voter's bliss point, and
strictly concave. The form of the loss-function becomes: L(i;x) =  ji   xj (with
 > 1) and citizen i's utility if policy x is implemented becomes:
Ui =  ji   xj
Analogously, parties' utility functions are, if the Democratic Party wins:
UD = 
   d; UR =  (1   d)
while if the Republican Party wins:
UD =  r; UR = 
   (1   r)
The same procedure is followed as in the linear case. Nevertheless, it is not possible
to nd a closed form solution, not even for specic values of . In order to simplify
13the exposition, and rule out the possibility of the Democratic Party's running on a




The results exposed in this section would still hold in case the oce-motivation
parameter 
 were small enough. The threshold level, though, is closely dependent
on the population composition and on the degree of risk-aversion. For this reason,
we chose to focus on the more basic case in which parties are solely oce-motivated.
Both parties will therefore choose their policy platforms in order to maximize
the following expected utilities:
UD = p(d;r) L(0;d) + [1   p(d;r)] L(0;r) (17)
UR = p(d;r) L(1;d) + [1   p(d;r)] L(1;r) (18)
Each party's expected utility|as represented by (17){(18)|is single-peaked with
respect to each party's own strategic variable.
The pure strategy Nash equilibrium policy platforms fd(M);r(M)g can be
found through the rst- and second-order conditions; given Lemma 1 and knowing
the equilibrium policy platforms, the equilibrium probability of winning for the
Democratic Party p(M) is then found. With these values in hand, we calculate
the social welfare as in (13), which is then maximized with respect to the variable
that determines the districting, i.e. the slant of the median district M.
Intuitively, parties will react more substantially to the districting the nearer is
their policy platform to their ideal policy. This is given by the fact that with concave
utility, the loss increases more than proportionally as one moves away from one's
own ideal point. As it is not possible to nd a closed form solution for the slant of
the socially optimal median district in the case of risk-averse players, the results of
these section come from numerical simulations.











> 0 if D < R
There are values of the parameters such that the optimal slant for the median
district is smaller in absolute value than in the linear case.6 In other words, the
6Our numerical simulations consistently gave us this result as long as min[D;R] > 15%. This
condition is met by all 48 contiguous States in the USA, according to the already cited NYT-CBS annual
polls and a fortiori in all the States in our empirical analysis. The unicity of the pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium has also been conrmed. The simulations are performed focusing on the cases where  2 [1;10]
and   0:3. This last restriction allows us to focus on cases in which the swing voters' preferences are
suciently heterogeneous, which is consistent with anecdotal knowledge and with the ndings of our
empirical analysis in Section 2.5. These results also hold as long as the oce-motivation parameter 
 is
small enough. Higher values of the parameter 
 may have two distinct eects. First, it may lead us to
14median district needs to be slanted in the same direction of the whole population,
but is going to be more centrist than the population as a whole. A sample of the
simulation results is reported in Table 1.
The electoral behavior that follows from Conjecture 1 could be summarized as
follows. Electoral competition leads parties once more to a draw in the median-
representative elections, with each of them expecting to obtain 50% of the seats
in the legislature. The median district leans towards the largest party, albeit to
a lesser extent than in the linear case. This depends on the fact that the higher
is the voters' risk-aversion, the more centrist will be the social optimum: partisan
(i.e. extremist) voters' preferences carry more weight, the higher the concavity of
the utility function, which forces the social planner to take the minority extremist
group into greater consideration.
Still, parties' policy platforms are aected by the districting, and dragged in
the same direction in which the general population leans, even if less than in the
benchmark linear case. At the national level, with a more centrist indierent voter,
the vote share accruing to each party reects more closely the population composi-
tion: the party with a larger partisan base receives an absolute majority of votes.
A positive oce-motivation would instead slightly turn the probability of winning
in favor of the party with a larger partisan base, that is the one that, having a
bliss point nearer to the socially optimal policy, is more keen on moving its policy
platform towards it. This feature does not change the direction of the seat{vote
curve bias, but reduces its value.
The eect on the seat{vote curve can be summed up in this way:
Conjecture 2. When voters and parties are risk-averse, there exist values of the
parameters such that the socially optimal seat{vote curve's bias is counterbalancing.
This result is exactly the opposite of Coate and Knight (2007). Their prescription
regarding the seat{vote curve is to have a reinforcing bias. If we were to implement
that in our setup, the median district would be one which is more extremist than
the whole population, and parties will move their policy platforms towards the
majority party's bliss point, in a way that would make the expected implemented
policy too extremist when compared to the social optimum. Voters' risk-aversion
instead makes the social optimum closer to the ideological center, and allowing
parties to endogenously condition their policy platforms on the districting implies
that the social planner must counterbalance the tendency of parties to move their
platforms too decidedly away from the center, following the districting.
4.3 Case 3: Parties with Asymmetric Oce-Motivation
In this section we explore how our results change when parties dier in their oce-
motivation. To that end we perform the same analysis as in Section 4, simply
assuming that the oce-motivation parameter 
 is not equal across parties.
violate the assumption according to which the Democratic Party cannot run on a more conservative policy
than the Republican Party. Secondly, in some cases in which the population's ideological distribution is
very unbalanced and the risk-aversion parameter  is very high the social planner may need to reward
the largest party in order to reach the social optimum, giving us opposite results from the one exposed
in Conjecture 1.
15We can therefore re-write the parties' expected utility as:
E[UD] = p [
D + L(0;d)] + (1   p) L(0;r) (19)
E[UR] = p L(1;d) + (1   p) [
R + L(1;d)] (20)
where 
D (
R) is the Democratic (Republican) Party's oce-motivation parameter.
In order to rule out the cases in which the Republicans run on a more liberal platform
than the Democrats, and to insure that the equilibrium policy platforms and the




R) < 4. j
D   
Rj < 4
By tracking exactly the same technique as in Case 1, we can see how the proba-
bility of winning for the Democratic Party as in Lemma 1 is not aected by the 
s.
The equilibrium policy platforms, nevertheless, are indeed going to be dierent:

















R   M (22)
As one may have expected the more oce-motivated party proposes a more centrist
policy, being more willing to go after a higher winning probability to the detriment of
its ideological coherence. The equilibrium probability of winning therefore becomes









showing an ex-post electoral advantage for the more oce-motivated party.
Our main result concerning the composition of the socially optimal median dis-


































which helps us to rule out corner solutions.
Proposition 20. To implement a welfare-maximizing districting, the median district













16as long as Condition 10 holds. When Condition 10 does not hold instead, the socially
























R) if 0 2 [ 1;a] (25)
Proof. See Appendix. 
Intuitively (focusing on the main case, when Condition 10 holds) the social planner
ought to shape the median district in a way that mirrors the population composition
(rst member on the right-hand side of equation [23]), but should also add a further
\slant" in favor of the most oce-motivated party (second member on the right-
hand side of equation [23]), which is the party that is more willing to pander to
the Independents' preferences. In a sense the social planner should favor the less
ideological party. When turning to the seat{vote curve composition, these modied
ndings lead us to a richer result, which we can describe in the following Proposition:
Proposition 30. When players are risk-neutral and parties are not equally oce-
motivated (
D 6= 
R), the seat{vote curve has a reinforcing bias in favor of the
more oce-motivated player. If the distribution of ideologies in the population is
particularly unbalanced (Condition 10 does not hold), then the optimal seat{vote
curve will include a bias in favor of the party most represented in the population.
Proof. See Appendix. 
As long as Condition 10 holds, when the socially optimal district is implemented,
the bias  is going to be in favor of the more oce-motivated party, i.e. it will be
positive if the Democratic Party is more oce-motivated (
D > 
R) and negative
(i.e. in favor of the Republicans) if the Republican Party is more oce-motivated
(
D < 
R). When the population composition is very extremist (if Condition 10
does not hold), the optimal bias will be further shifted in favor of the largest partisan
group.
The intuitive reason why the social planner should award an advantage (bias
in its favor) to the more oce-motivated party is straightforward. In this way the
social planner rewards the fact that the more oce-motivated party proposes a
policy platform nearer to the social optimum, because it will be more interested in
winning the independent votes and increasing its probability to win.
A further feature of having asymmetric parties must be underlined, especially
in light of the empirical evidence on elections. In Case 1 (risk-neutral players, sym-
metric parties) the social planner sets up a median district which is a microcosm of
the whole nation (Proposition 2), and the optimal seat{vote curve stemming from
it is unbiased (Proposition 3). This also implies that both at the national level and
in the median district each party expects to receive exactly 50% of votes. Allow-
ing parties to be asymmetrically oce-motivated instead creates a more realistic
electoral outcome. As pointed out above, the more oce-motivated party enjoys
a higher probability of winning than its opposition, and receives (on average) an
absolute majority of votes both in the median district and at the national level.
This mirrors more closely the majority of elections, in which there is an ex-ante
frontrunner, but no party is 100% sure of winning on the day before the elections.
17Having our theoretical model encompass this (very likely) situation will be of great
help when calibrating the theoretical model on actual electoral data.
Case 4: Legislative Bargaining  a la Coate and Knight
(2007)
In this section, in order to have a closer comparison with Coate and Knight (2007),
we check if our results in Cases 1 and 2 are dependent on the particular way the
legislature decides on the implemented policy (majority voting) or if our results
are robust to the adoption of the legislative bargaining solution that Coate and
Knight (2007) assumed. In their model, parties represent the two extreme policy
platforms (0 and 1), and the legislature implements a policy which is the average of
the two parties' platforms weighted by their seat shares. In this section we keep our
base case characteristics of endogenous party platform, but the policy to implement
will be chosen through a bargaining process  a la Coate and Knight (2007) and not
though majority voting.
In order to compare more closely our result with the ones of Coate and Knight
(2007), the analysis of risk-averse voters is performed assuming quadratic utility
functions, and it is assumed that parties are solely policy motivated (
 = 0). The
latter assumption is coherent with a polity in which there is no explicit ruling
party, and where the implemented policy is the fruit of bargaining between the two
parliamentary delegations.
This setup implies a particularly highly sophisticated social planner, who must
anticipate the parties' endogenous policy proposals, their eect on voting in each
district, on the composition of the legislature, and the consequent eect on the
\bargaining" in the legislature. As in Coate and Knight (2007), we assume that
voters vote \naively" for the party proposing the policy nearer to their ideal point,
not taking into considerations forms of strategic voting in which citizens anticipate
the bargaining in the legislature. The assumption that each party proposes a single
nation-wide policy before the elections is also maintained, and Representatives will
stand for that policy, and bargain from that position.
The timing of the game could be therefore be described as follows:
1. The districting is implemented.
2. Parties propose their policies fd;rg.
3. Voters vote in each district for the party whose policy is closer to their bliss
point.
4. The legislature is elected.
5. Bargaining: the implemented policy x = S d+(1 S) r is the average between
the proposed ones, weighted by the seats of each party, where S is the seat
share won by Democrats.
For the sake of brevity, we are going to analyze the case of risk-neutral play-
ers (linear utilities) simultaneously with the risk-averse case. We dene parties'
preferences as:
UD = L(0;x); UR = L(1;x) (26)
18which in case of risk-neutrality becomes
UD =  [S d + (1   S) r]; UR =  [1   (S d + (1   S) r)] (27)
which in the case of risk-averse players becomes
UD =  [S d + (1   S) r]2; UR =  [1   (S d + (1   S) r)]2 (28)
where S is the seat share obtained by the Democratic Party. The social planner,
instead of picking the leaning of the median district|which would be meaningless
in this setup|picks the welfare-maximizing bias and responsiveness of the seat{vote
curve. In order to more easily compare our results to the ones of Coate and Knight











where V is the quantity of nation-wide votes obtained by the Democratic Party, a
the bias (how many more seats than 50% the Democratic Party would get with 50%
of the votes) and b the responsiveness of the curve (how much the seat share would
vary with a 1% variation in the vote percentage).
The amount of votes V the Democratic Party can expect to have is therefore:














The Democratic Party will obtain the votes of all its partisans (D) and of all the
swing voters who are expected to be on the left hand side of the indierent voter i,
with ideology (d + r)=2.
Plugging this expression for Democratic votes (30) into the seat{vote function
(29), and then plugging the resulting expression for S into the parties' utilities (26),
we can maximize each party's utility function with respect to its policy proposal
and obtain parties' reaction function and the equilibrium policy platforms.
Proposition 4. If the implemented policy is decided through parliamentary bar-






















independently of voters' attitude towards risk.
Proof. See Appendix. 
The proposed policies keep some of the characteristics present in the \majority
voting" base case. Policies will be more liberal if there are more Democratic than
Republican partisans in the population. Again, the districting will equally aect
the decisions of both parties: if the districting favors the Democrats (a > 0), both
policies will be dragged towards the left.
19Corollary 1. In the setting of Proposition 4, the Democratic Party will obtain on
average exactly 50% of seats (independently of voters' attitude towards risk), and











Proof. Plugging (31){(32) into (30), and then back again into (29), we obtain
the equilibrium expected share of seats of the Democratic Party in the legislature
(S = 1=2), and the \bargained" policy as in (33). .
We can see how the implemented policy x maintains the now well-known char-
acteristics: more liberal if there are more liberals than conservatives, and more
liberal if the districting favors the Democrats. Moreover the elections, as in the
absence of bargaining, will produce on average an absolutely balanced legislature.
Now that we know the equilibrium implemented policy (33), we can plug it in to
the social welfare function as in (13). The social planner will decide the seat{vote
curve (i.e. a and b) such that social welfare is maximized.
Proposition 5. If voters are risk-neutral, the social planner should implement a
seat{vote curve such that a = 0, while the optimal value of the responsiveness b is
indeterminate. If voters are risk-averse, the optimal bias and responsiveness must
be such that
a =  
(D   R)(2   I)
4
 b
Proof. See Appendix. 
Comparing Proposition 3 and Conjecture 2 with Proposition 5, it is clear that
our ndings are robust with respect to the way the legislature decides on the policy
to implement: whether majority voting or legislative bargaining is used, the social
planner should implement an unbiased seat{vote curve if voters are risk-neutral,
and one biased against the largest partisan group if voters are risk-averse.7
We can now look a bit more deeply into the results of Proposition 5. To avoid
confusion, we add the subscript l as in linear to indicate the risk-neutral case results,
and q as in quadratic to indicate the risk-averse case results. In the case of risk-






























(D   R) (36)
7The bias of the optimal seat{vote curve in the case of risk-averse voters is negative as long as I < 2.
This is always the case according to the empirical simulations reported in next section.






























(D   R) (39)
In the case of risk-neutral voters, assuming a linear seat{vote curve leads us
to have an indeterminate responsiveness. Any responsiveness|i.e. any mean-
preserving increase in the variance of the value of the implemented policy|will
not have any eect on social welfare, given that both the seat{vote curve and the
utility functions are linear. In the case of risk-aversion, optimal bias and responsive-
ness are inversely related. In this case the social planner has to choose an optimal
bias{responsiveness bundle such that on average the implemented policy is equal
to the socially optimal one, and the standard deviation of the implemented policy
is minimized. Observing Propositions 4 and 5 we can see how a larger bias (and
smaller responsiveness) increases the distance between the party platforms, while
increasing the responsiveness b increases the steepness of the seat{vote curve, and
with that the variance of the expected implemented policy. It means that the social
planner has to choose between a more \stable" (low b) seat{vote curve, that nev-
ertheless allows parties to be more extremist, or constrain parties to more centrist
policies (low a), which in turn binds the social planner to a more responsive (and
therefore risky) seat{vote curve.
The ndings of the cases analyzed are summed up in Table I. We can see how
the socially optimal seat{vote curve should be unbiased no matter what the consti-
tution (parliamentary bargaining with exogenous or endogenous policy platforms,
or majority voting with endogenous policy platforms) if voters and parties are risk-
neutral, and parties are equally oce-motivated. It should instead be biased against
the largest party when voters and parties are risk-averse, while the \reinforcing" bias
found by Coate and Knight (2007) is socially optimal only in the concurrence of
exogenous party platforms, risk-aversion, and parliamentary bargaining.
5 An Empirical Analysis
In this section we estimate the possible welfare gain from implementing the socially
optimal districting when voters are risk-neutral. The aim of this operation is to
compare the result of our model to the one obtained by Coate and Knight (2007),
and more generally to have a quantitative estimation of what is the welfare loss
of not laying down the socially optimal districting. We will see that our empirical
analysis is coherent with the theoretical prediction of the model as long as parties
are asymmetrically oce-motivated. To perform this analysis we need to calculate
the welfare under the optimal districting Wopt and under the actual districting Wact.
Both of these measures are calculated using the formula as in (13). Given that the
value of the social welfare is within the [ 1;0] interval, we dene the welfare gain
21as:8
Wgain =
(1 + Wopt)   (1 + Wact)
1 + Wact (40)
The dataset has been kindly provided by Brian Knight, and it is the same data
on which Coate and Knight (2007) performed their empirical analysis. It contains
the electoral results of the elections of State Lower Houses, for the 5 electoral rounds
held after the redistricting that followed the 1990 Census (1992, 1994, 1996, 1998 and
2000), together with demographic data on each district's population (e.g. average
household income, percentage of African-Americans, elderly people, college gradu-
ates, share of urban, suburban and rural population). We also use State-level polling
data from the New York Times-CBS survey,9 in which a representative sample of
voters is annually asked to self-identify as Democrat, Republican or independent.
For the purpose of this paper the 1991{2000 average level of self-identication as
Democrat, Republican, or independent in each of the 28 States is used.
From the raw data just described, we are in possession only of the shares of
Democrats (D), Republicans (R) and Independents (I) for each State. We in-
stead need to estimate the uncertainty parameters (, ), to identify the median
district, and to calculate the Democratic skewness act
M and each parties' oce-
motivation parameter f
D;
Rg. Once we have been able to do so, we can calculate
through our theoretical ndings the optimal Democratic slant of the median district,
the policy platforms of the two parties according to both the actual and optimal
districting, and nally the welfare and the welfare gain.
5.1 Empirical Approach
In this section we explain the technique through which it is possible to estimate the
composition of each district in terms of partisan Democrats and Republicans and
Independents, and the uncertainty parameters.
First of all, we need to make more explicit the theoretical relation between
the policy platforms proposed by the two parties, the composition of each district
(and in particular the median district) and the amount of votes obtained by the
Democratic Party. From Proposition 10 we know that the theoretical equilibrium

















8Coate and Knight (2007) dened voters' utility as
Ui =  +  L(i;x)
assuming =  1; we instead assumed a simpler functional form: Ui = L(i;x). According to their (more
general) utility's functional form the value of welfare gain we nd through (40) would be the maximum
welfare gain. Choosing to use our simpler functional form, implicitly implies assuming that = = 1.
Our results about the welfare gain are perfectly comparable with the one by Coate and Knight (2007).
In fact in their paper they mostly refer to the maximimum welfare gains, which correspond to the case
when = = 1.
9These data are available at web site http://php.indiana.edu/ wright1/cbs7603 pct.zip. Of this annual
survey we used data from 1991 to 2000.
22The share of votes Vj earned by the Democratic Party in a representative district j
is






+ m   ) (41)
Substituting in d and r we obtain














where Dj is the share of Democrats in district j, Ij is the share of Independents
in district j, M is the Democratic leaning of the median district, m is the ideology
of the median swing voter, which is the result of the realization of a random variable
with mean 1=2.
It can be observed that while each Democratic partisan votes for the Democratic
Party, only a share of the Independents does. The amount of Independents voting
Democratic depends on three factors, represented within the square brackets in (42):
rst of all, a higher oce-motivation leads the Democratic Party's policy more to
the center, increasing its share of votes, secondly the policy platforms are aected
by the districting M (a more Democratic leaning districting drags the platforms
leftwards, decreasing the Democratic vote share), and nally the share of votes
hinges on the realization of the random shock hitting m.
The only parameter of (42) that can be directly found in the data is Vj: of
each district we have at most ve observations of the share of votes obtained by
the Democratic Party in each election round. All other parameters need to be
estimated.
Knowing the distribution of m, from (41) we can compute the mean E[Vj] and
standard deviation Vj of the Democratic share of votes, for a given district j:


















R). Analogous arguments can be applied to obtain the mean
and standard deviation of the Democratic votes at the State level:















With a suciently long panel, the estimation of moments (mean and variance of
votes to the Democratic Party in each district and overall in each State) would sim-
ply consist of reporting the sample average and standard error. In the U.S. though,
redistricting happens every ten years, and therefore for each district our database
contains at most ve observations. Moreover there is a non-negligible number of
uncontested districts, i.e. districts in which in all the ve election rounds only
one candidate ran. We therefore track the methodology already used in Coate and
Knight (2007), calculating the districts' moments as a function of the demographic
23characteristics of each district, using a bootstrapping technique over the following
random eect model with heteroscedasticity:
Vjt = X0
j1 + 1j + ujt (45)
ln(u2
jt) = X0
j2 + 2j + ln(!2
t) (46)
where Vjt is the share of votes for the Democratic Party in district j at the election
round t, Xj is the matrix of controls, including the demographic data on the district
and the State-level polls, 1 and 2 are the parameters to be estimated, and j
and j are the district-specic random eects, which are assumed to be normally
distributed and with standard error  and , respectively. The last terms in the
two equation are the usual white noise. The estimation technique is a standard
two-step approach: rst the percentage of votes to the Democratic Party (Vjt) are
regressed on the district characteristics (Xj). Then the log of the square residuals
of the rst-step regression is regressed on the same set of variables. This two-step
regression is performed on the whole dataset, containing 28 States. State-specic
dummies are added. In this way we allow districts with the same demographic
characteristics, but belonging to dierent States to have dierent voting behavior.
Nevertheless these regressions do not allow us to know the district-specic mo-
ments. Two sources of uncertainty are to be controlled: rst of all we have the esti-
mated and not the true values of the parameters of the two regressions (1;2;1;2);
secondly, we do not observe the random eects (j;j). That is why a bootstrapping
technique is used: for each replication r = 1;2;:::;100 a sample of size N is drawn
with replacement from the dataset of N districts, where N is the number of districts
with at least one contested election. Then the estimation with the standard two-
step approach is performed for each of the 100 samples. In this way we obtain the





r=1 . Nevertheless to
learn the district-specic mean and standard error we need a further step in order
to take the random eects into account. We therefore draw from a standard normal
distribution the random eects (r
j;r
j) for each replication r and each district j.














We are then able to calculate the State-specic moments averaging across districts
within a State, and use the average estimated parameters from the bootstrap to
calculate the simulated mean and variance of the voting distribution of uncontested
districts.
5.2 Calibration of the Theoretical Model
After having performed these regressions, we can then proceed to the calibration of
our theoretical results.
In this section we will indicate with a hat the parameters obtained from our
empirical simulations, and with a tilde the ones that come from calibrating the
24empirical ndings into our theoretical model. In line with Coate and Knight (2007),
we assume that




Let's recall (44), which describes the standard deviation of the votes for the







As our notation suggests, V is obtained from the bootstrap procedure just de-
scribed, I is instead assumed to be equal to the data from the NYT-CBS polls.
From (49) and (50) we can therefore obtain the State-level indices of aggregate and
idiosyncratic uncertainty (e  and e ). Consequently we can calculate the district-








Lastly, in the next paragraphs we will identify the median district for each State, and
calculate the value of its Democratic slant M together with the oce-motivation
parameters.
In order to do this, we must rst recall the formula to calculate the Democratic





Plugging the expression for Dj from (50)|and knowing that Dj+Rj+Ij = 1|
into (52), we obtain
j =







Even if M and the oce-motivation parameter are still unknown, we are still
able to order all the districts according to the value of (2\ E[Vj]   1)=(Ij) State by
State, and pinpoint the median district. For States with an even number of districts




-th district as the median.
From Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 we know that where parties are equally oce-
motivated, each party will win with probability 50%, i.e. the expected amount of
votes for the Democratic Party in the median district will be exactly 50%. Let's
use the expression for the share of votes to the Democratic Party in a district, see
(43), and apply it to the median district:


















From our simulations we can directly obtain \ E[VM], while e IM and e  have been
calibrated from (50) and (51). Consequently, from (54) we are able to extract a
value for e 
DR, the calibrated value of the extra oce-motivation of the Democratic
Party. It is not however going to be possible to disentangle the eects of each
party's oce-motivation. This, together with the requirement that oce-motivation
parameters be strictly positive, leads us to assume the following:
25Assumption 4. e 
D = maxfe 
DR;0g. e 
R =  minfe 
DR;0g.
Next, we are able to calculate the actual slant of the median district act
M . To do
so we need to go back to (44), which describes the voteshare of the Democratic Party
at the national level. We report it below, indicating with a tilde the parameters
already found through the calibration, and with a bar the values taken directly from
our raw data:
[ E[V ] = D +
1
2





D   e 
R)
and obtain a value for the actual partisan slant act
M of the median district.
With the calibrated values of these parameters in hand, we can calculate the wel-
fare under the actual districting (through calculating the endogenous actual policy
platforms as in Proposition 10) and the welfare under the socially optimal district-
ing (through calculating the socially optimal median district's partisan slant as in
Proposition 20 and the endogenous optimal policy platforms as in Proposition 10).
This work is performed separately for each of the 28 States in our dataset.
In Table III we report some ndings from both the empirical simulation and
the model's calibration. In particular it is worth underlining how six out of 28
States (Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Utah) vio-
late Assumption 20. In these States the values of the calibrated oce-motivation
parameters (e 
D and e 
R) do not full our model's assumptions, and therefore are
discarded from our analysis. This rests on the fact that the data suggests that in
these States one of the two parties enjoys a large ex-ante electoral advantage. In
States where the data (and anecdotal knowledge as well) show a very strong pre-
dominance of one of the two parties there is de facto no electoral competition for a
legislative majority, and therefore our model fails to be a good predictor of parties'
behaviors.
In Table IV the results from the welfare analysis are spelled out. Unsurprisingly,
allowing parties to strategically choose their platforms makes parties more willing
to appeal to independent voters' preferences, however the actual districting may
have been designed. Consequently, the welfare gain from implementing the socially
optimal districting is quite small, mostly below 1%, even smaller than the one found
by Coate and Knight (2007), where parties were constrained to run on extremist
platforms. Our empirical nding therefore strongly reinforces Coate and Knight
(2007) when they state that a shift towards a districting properly laid down by a
benevolent social planner would not signicantly increase the overall population's
welfare.
6 Concluding remarks
We analyzed the socially optimal districting in a framework in which parties en-
dogenously choose nationwide policy platforms vis- a-vis the districting. Parties
react strategically to the districting, presenting policy platforms that will be more
liberal the more the the districting leans towards the Democrats. We investigated
what the districting should be in order to reach the welfare optimum. Secondly, we
analyzed which seat{vote curve is consistent with the social optimum.
Our analysis shows that the social planner should design the districting so that
the median district's composition reects the population's ideological leaning, in
26order to bring the expected implemented policy towards the welfare maximizing
policy.
The consequent seat{vote curve that stems from this nding is unbiased in the
special case in which players are risk neutral (linear preferences). In this case, the
optimal median district must exactly match the general population composition,
both parties win with equal probability by proposing policies skewed towards the
larger partisan group in the population, i.e. equidistant from the welfare maximizing
policy, and they both expect to get exactly 50% of votes at the national level. A tied
election would therefore give way to the implementation of a policy which is more
liberal if the population leans on the left, and more conservative if the population
leans on the right, matching perfectly the welfare maximizing policy.
In the more interesting scenario in which voters and parties are risk-averse, the
optimal seat{vote curve instead needs to be biased against the largest partisan
group. In this case the social planner ought to draw a median district which is more
centrist than the population, albeit still leaning in the same direction. Consequently
the policy proposals will be|even if less decidedly than in the risk-neutral case|
leaning towards the same side as the population (and the districting). The party
with a larger partisan base will get more than half of the votes and will expect
to win exactly half of the seats. For this reason the seat{vote curve will show a
counterbalancing bias, i.e. a bias against the larger party in the population.
The results regarding the bias of the seat{vote curve are very robust: even in
those cases where the party caucuses in the legislature bargain over the policy to
implement (as in Coate and Knight, 2007), the bias remains null if voters are risk-
neutral and counterbalancing if voters are risk-averse.
These results strongly contradict Coate and Knight's (2007) prescriptions re-
garding the socially optimal districting. In their seminal paper they modeled a
polity in which parties' platform are exogenous, but the implemented policy is the
result of a \bargaining" process in which the chosen policy is the average of the
exogenous party platforms weighted by their seat share, i.e., the policy which max-
imizes the legislators' joint utility. In such a setup, the optimal seat{vote curve is
unbiased when voters are risk-neutral, but requires a reinforcing bias when voters
are risk-averse. This is because of the joint eect of the bargaining process in the
legislature and the exogeneity of parties' policy platforms. The implemented policy
moves quite smoothly with changes in electoral results, therefore the social planner
has to give a seat advantage to the party that proposes the policy closer to the
socially optimal one, so that the average legislator's preferred policy matches the
average voter's.
An empirical calibration of the base model (majority voting and risk-neutral
agents) is performed on data from the U.S. State Lower Houses' elections of 28
States for 5 electoral rounds (1992 to 2000). It appears that implementing the
socially optimal districting would indeed increase the social welfare, but the size of
this eect is even smaller than the one found by Coate and Knight (2007). Letting
parties condition their policy platforms on the districting naturally constrains them
to take swing voters' preferences into greater account. This in turn makes the size
of the potential welfare gain from implementing the optimal districting very small:
in the majority of States it remains below 1%.
Further research is needed in order to analyze in greater depth the political econ-
27omy of districting and its policy and welfare consequences. The eects of migration
across districts, the microfoundation of the process through which the legislature
decides the implemented policy and the political-economy motivations that lead
politicians to devolve or not the power of redistricting to independent commissions
have yet to be analyzed.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Amrita Dhillon and Ben Lockwood for their continual advice. I
thank as well Tim Besley, Steve Coate and Brian Knight, and the participants of
seminars held at the University of Warwick, the World Conference of the Game
Theory Society at Northwestern University, the EEA Annual Meeting in Milan and
the RES Annual Conference in Surrey for useful comments. The usual disclaimer
applies.
References
Alesina, Alberto, \Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System
with Rational Voters," The American Economic Review, 1988, 78 (4), 796{805.
Ansolabehere, Stephen and James M. Snyder Jr., \The Incumbency Advan-
tage in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Oces: 1942-2000,"
Election Law Journal, 2002, 1, 315{338.
Bernhardt, Dan, John Duggan, and Francesco Squintani, \The case for
Responsible Parties," American Political Science Review, 2009, 103 (4), 570{587.
Besley, Timothy and Ian Preston, \Electoral Bias and Policy Choice: Theory
and Evidence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2007, 122 (4), 1473{1510.
and Stephen Coate, \An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, feb 1997, 112 (1), 85{114.
Callander, Steven, \Political Motivations," Review of Economic Studies, 2008,
75, 671{697.
Calvert, Randall L., \Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candi-
date Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence," American Journal of Political
Science, 1985, 29 (1), 69{95.
Coate, Stephen, \Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy," The American
Economic Review, 2004, 94 (3), 628{655.
and Brian Knight, \Socially Optimal Districting: A Theoretical and Empirical
Exploration," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2007, 122 (4), 1409{1471.
Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Hallaran, \The 45% Solution: Racial Gerry-
mandering and Representative Democracy," Working Paper, Columbia University
2004.
28Friedman, John N. and Richard T. Holden, \Optimal Gerrymandering: Some-
times Pack, but Never Crack," American Economic Review, 2008, 98 (1), 113{44.
Gelman, Andrew and Gary King, \A Unied Method of Evaluating Electoral
Systems and Redistricting Plans," American Journal of Political Science, 1994,
38 (2), 514{554.
Gilligan, Thomas W. and John G. Matsusaka, \Public choice principles of
redistricting," Public Choice, 2006, 129, 381{398.
Gul, Faruk and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, \Strategic Redistricting," American
Economic Review, 2010, 100 (4), 1616{41.
Kendall, Maurice G. and Alan Stewart, \The Law of the Cubic Proportion in
Election Results," British Journal of Sociology, 1950, 1, 183{196.
Lizzeri, Francesco and Nicola Persico, \The Provision of Public Goods under
Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, 2001, 91, 225{339.
Lockwood, Ben, \Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization," Review
of Economic Studies, 2002, 69, 313{337.
Osborne, Martin J. and Al Slivinski, \A Model of Political Competition with
Citizen Candidates," Journal of Economics, 1996, 111, 65{96.
Owen, Guillermo and Bernard Grofman, \Gerrymandering, Legislative Com-
position, and National Policy Outcomes," Political Geography Quarterly, jan
1988, 7 (1), 5{22.
Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini, \Comparative Pol-
itics and Public Finance," Journal of Political Economy, 2000, 108, 1121{1161.
Prat, Andrea, \Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," Review of Economic
Studies, 2002, 69, 999{1018.
Sherstyuk, Katerina, \How to gerrymander: A formal analysis," Public Choice,
1998, 95, 27{49.
Shotts, Kenneth W., \Gerrymandering, Legislative Composition, and National
Policy Outcomes," American Journal of Political Science, 2002, 46 (2), 398{414.
Wittman, Donald, \Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories,"
The American Political Science Review, 1983, 77 (1), 142{157.
Appendix
Coate and Knight (2007) with risk-neutral voters
From Coate and Knight (2007) we know that the share of votes obtained by the
Democratic Party is






  m + 

(55)










The implemented policy is the weighted average of the Democratic Party's policy
(0) and the Republican Party's policy (1), weighted by the seat share S. The policy
is therefore 1   S. Consequently we can write a social welfare function W
W =  






j(1   S)   xjdx

(57)
that could also be transformed in this way:
W =  






((1   S)   x) dx +
Z m+
1 S
(x   (1   S)) dx

We can then maximize W with respect to S through simple rst order conditions:
@W
@S
= D   D +
I

(1   S   m) = 0 (58)















Proof of Lemma 1













Swing voters are uniformly distributed around the median m as in !  U[m ;m+
], therefore
F(x) =
x   m + 
2
Substituting in (61):
M > 1   (
r+d

































Proof of Propositions 2 and 20
The results of Propositions 2 and 20 hinge on the fact that in equilibrium the en-
dogenous policies fall within the following intervals:
d 2 [ m   ;1=2 +    ]; and r 2 [1=2    + ;  m + ] (65)
If this is the case, getting rid of the modulus operator, the social welfare function










[ (d   x)] f(x)dx + I
Z m+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[ (r   x)] f(x)dx +
Z m+
r
[ (x   r)] f(x)dx
i
h(m)dm (66)








therefore the rst-order conditions are necessary and sucient.














From these results, simple algebra shows us that in equilibrium d(
M) and
r(
M) belong to the intervals as in (65) as long as Condition 1|Condition 10 in
case of Proposition 20|holds.
31In the cases when Condition 1 (Condition 10 in case of Proposition 20) does not
hold, the social welfare function is no longer equal to the one in (66). This is due to
the fact that for some realizations of m, all the independent voters lie on the same
side of the winning policy. This implies that the sign of some of the arguments of
the absolute values in the loss functions changes with respect to (66).
As an example, here is the proof for one of the cases one could analyze:




If  2 [b;1], simple algebra shows us that d <  m   . Therefore the social welfare










[ (d   x)] f(x)dx + I
Z m+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[ (r   x)] f(x)dx +
Z m+
r
[ (x   r)] f(x)dx
i
h(m)dm (67)
Notice the dierence between the rst two lines of (66) and the rst four of (67).
Again, the second-order conditions on (67) show that the function is always concave.







The two welfare functions are twice continuously dierentiable, strictly concave in
M. They are in fact simple parabolas. Therefore,
@W
@M



















W  ~ M  argmax
M
W0 (70)
32It can be calculated that













Considering that we are analyzing the case in which D R
I 2 [b;1], expression (71)
















which is always true.
Proof of Lemmas 2 and 20, and Propositions 3 and 30
Lemma 20 and Proposition 30 are generalizations of Lemma 2 and Proposition 3.
We proceed therefore just with the proof of the more general ones.
First, let's analyze for which realization of m the Democratic Party obtains ex-
actly 50% of votes under the socially optimal districting. The votes the Democratic
Party is going to obtain at the national level are






  m + ) (72)
while the votes obtained by the Democratic Party in the median district are






  m + ) (73)







From Proposition 20, we know that  is going to be equal to zero when Condition
10 holds and the parties are equally oce-motivated (
D = 
R). This can be
summed up in this way:




 2 [ 1;a] !  < 0





R !  > 0

D < 
R !  < 0
Plugging in the equilibrium value of the policy platforms fd(
M);r(
M)g from


























Now we can verify which party carries the median district when m = ~ m, (i.e.,
VM(~ m) 7 1=2) and enjoys a seat{vote curve bias in its favor.








This means that the Democratic Party will carry the district as long as  > 0,
the Republican Party will carry it if  < 0, and elections will result in a tie if  = 0.
This proves Lemmas 2 and 20 and Propositions 3 and 30.
Proof of Proposition 4
We dene the bargained policy as
x = S d + (1   S) r
Therefore the utility functions can be rewritten as
UD =  xq (78)
UR =  (1   x)q (79)
where q = 1 in the risk-neutral case and q = 2 in the risk-averse case. We have











Finally the votes obtained by the Democratic Party can be written as














Substituting (81) into (80), and then (80) into (78) and (79), we obtain the fully
explicit (and concave) utility function of each party, depending on the fundamentals
of the economy and on the two platforms. The optimal Nash equilibrium platforms







Given that we restrict our attention to the interior solutions, whatever the value
of q the best-response and the equilibrium platforms are going to be the same.
Analyzing the best response of the Democratic Party:
@UDD
@d








which is the rst-order condition for the linear case. The two rst-order conditions
for the two parties are orthogonal and give us Proposition 4.
Feasibility: an Intuitive Argument
As already argued in the body of the paper, districts with the same median-district
partisan slant M are strategically equivalent, i.e., elicit the exact same strategic
behavior from voters, parties and social planner and generate the same social wel-
fare. Consequently there are very many dierent specic districtings that full the
optimality conditions.
This section gives an intuitive argument on why the feasibility constraints are
unlikely to be binding. We impose specic and stringent assumptions on the dis-
tricting, and nd sucient conditions for feasibility, and argue that these sucient
conditions are very unlikely to be binding. A fortiori in a general case, feasibility
is hardly going to be an issue.
When voters are risk-neutral and parties are symmetric (see Proposition 2),
the optimal median district has the same partisan slant as the whole population.
Consequently a districting consistent with optimality is always feasible (one trivial
example being uniform districting, in which all the districts have the exact same
composition, which obviously is also the general population composition).
In case the parties are not symmetric, and/or voters are risk-averse instead of
neutral, feasibility remains an issue.
Let's assume
Assumption 5. j = c 8j < M; j = C 8j > M; Ij = I 8j
where j is the index referring to districts, ordered by j, and M is the index given to
the median district. With this assumption we restrict our attention to districtings
in which all districts to the left of the median are uniform among themselves, and
so are all the districts above the median. Obviously, just by the very denition of
median, it is also true that c  M  C. Moreover, again just to simplify the
analysis, it is assumed that all districts contains the same amount of independents.
We also assume
Assumption 6. D  R
and then generalize our results to encompass the opposite case as well.
Let's nd out which is the \most extreme" districting that is feasible under
Assumption 5, i.e. so as to maximize (C   c). We can re-distribute voters across
districts so to have this \most extreme feasible districting" in the following way: one
can move all Republican voters that belong to districts on the right-hand-side of the
median, and move them on the left-hand side (substituting them with Democratic
voters who belonged to districts on the left-hand side). The resulting districting is
35the following:
Dc = D   R; Rc = 2R;
DC = D + R; RC = R   R = 0;
Ic = IC = IM = I







; M 2 [c;C]
More generally, lifting Assumption 6, the most extremist feasible districting



















if D < R
Applying these formulae to the NYT-CBS poll data as in Table III, we can
see how the feasible interval for M is almost always a superset of the interval
[ 1;1]. The only exeption is Rhode Island in which the feasible interval is M 2
[ 0:91;1:44]. This is largely due to the fact that in Rhode Island a very large share
of the population declares itself as independent, and in Assumption 5 we constrained
the social planner to uniformly distribute the independents across districts. Lifting
that part of the assumption would allow Rhode Island's social planner to implement
any district in the [ 1;1] interval.
This simple exercise shows how only under very peculiar circumstances the social
planner may not be able to draw a districting in which the median district partisan
slant is any value within [ 1;1].
Proof of Proposition 5
In the linear case,










(x   y) dy +
Z m+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In the quadratic case,
















(D   R)  
2a
bI
36First of all, the second-order condition with respect to x conrms that the function
is strictly concave, therefore the rst-order conditions are necessary and sucient.













Solving this, we nd that in the linear case @W
@a = 0 for a = 0, while @W
@b ja=0 = 0,
leaving the value of b in the linear case indeterminate.
In the quadratic case the solution leaves one free variable, i.e., is such that
a =  









0.01 -0.241 -0.238 Y
0.05 -0.2 -0.1875 Y
0.1 -0.143 -0.128 Y
0.15 -0.0769 -0.0625 Y
0.2 0 0 Y
R=0.2 0.25 0.0909 0.0625 Y
0.3 0.2 0.125 Y
0.35 0.333 0.1875 Y
0.4 0.5 0.25 Y
0.45 0.714 0.312 Y
0.49 0.935 0.3625 Y
0.01 -0.42 -0.3625 Y
0.05 -0.385 -0.3125 Y
0.1 -0.333 -0.25 Y
0.15 -0.273 -0.1875 Y
0.2 -0.2 -0.125 Y
R=0.3 0.25 -0.111 -0.0625 Y
0.3 0 0 Y
0.35 0.143 0.0625 Y
0.4 0.333 0.125 Y
0.45 0.6 0.1875 Y
0.49 0.905 0.2375 Y
0.01 -0.661 -0.4875 Y
0.05 -0.636 -0.438 Y
0.1 -0.6 -0.37 Y
0.15 -0.555 -0.3125 Y
0.2 -0.5 -0.25 Y
R=0.4 0.25 -0.429 -0.42 Y
0.3 -0.333 -0.125 Y
0.35 -0.2 -0.0625 Y
0.4 0 0 Y
0.45 0.333 0.0625 Y
0.49 0.818 0.1125 Y
Table 1: Sample of Simulation Results. Verication that the median district's partisan
slant is smaller in absolute value in the risk-averse case, for some values of the population
composition, and given  = 2, 
 = 0,  = 0:1,  = 0:4.
















No bias  Counterbalancing Bias 
Endogenous Platform 
+ 
Parliamentary Bargaining  
 
No bias  Counterbalancing Bias 
Table 2: Socially optimal seat{vote curve bias according to the constitution and players'
risk-aversion.
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